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Agricultural Input Subsidies in 
Sub-Saharan Africa
Tamahi Kato and Martin Greeley
Abstract The Institute of Development Studies (IDS) has contributed 
to African agricultural policy debate which has featured prominently in 
growth and poverty reduction assessment in sub-Saharan Africa. This 
debate has rekindled interest in the use of agricultural input subsidies to 
promote food security nationally and at household level. After the enforced 
withdrawal of these agricultural subsidies during the structural adjustment 
era, their re-introduction as ‘market-smart’ subsidies has led to several 
assessment studies. This article draws on evidence from five countries and a 
detailed study in Ruvuma Region, Tanzania. These subsidy programmes were 
reported to be successful in increasing maize yields and reducing poverty 
and had positive spillover effects on input use by non-recipients and private 
sector development in rural areas. However, unclear programme objectives 
and serious implementation problems prevented most of these programmes 
from being effective. These results underline the controversial nature of 
subsidy policies, with contemporary debate mirroring historical controversy. 
1 Introduction
Development theory has built on the historic experience of  rich countries 
to identify a foundational role for agricultural growth in national 
economic development. The policy implications of  this role have been 
controversial and the Institute of  Development Studies (IDS) has made 
seminal contributions to this central development debate, notably through 
the publications of  Michael Lipton (e.g. Lipton 1968, 1977, 1989 and 
1991). Much of  the controversy has centred on the role of  agricultural 
subsidies. Key actors, especially the international financial institutions, 
have supported different policies – in favour of  subsidies and then opposed 
– in response to shifting ideological influence and the contestation 
between state and market. IDS (e.g. Colclough and Manor 1991) was 
deeply involved in the critique of  neoliberal orthodoxy which advocated 
an unhealthy dependence on market-based solutions to development 
problems. Policy debates were especially vehement in the 1980s in 
sub-Saharan Africa (SSA) which experienced the enforced adoption of  
structural adjustment, including the withdrawal of  agricultural subsidies 
along with a wide range of  market-based agricultural policies.
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Agricultural input subsidies are again contentious today in policy 
debate over ‘market-smart’ subsidies, making this a particularly 
pertinent topic to explore in this IDS Bulletin. This article examines 
the use of  agricultural subsidies policies through an analysis of  design 
and implementation issues in five SSA countries before drawing on a 
detailed Tanzanian case study. It provides policy conclusions relevant to 
the current enthusiasm for ‘market-smart’ subsidies.
In the years before the mid-1970s, a number of  SSA countries 
developed food security programmes by providing subsidised inputs, 
farm credit, extension services and marketing facilities to farmers as 
well as by controlling markets and food crop prices (Maxwell 2001). 
These subsidies supported nationalistic policies by providing direct 
support to farmers and were seen as a key tool for development through 
agricultural intensification. However, subsidies also represented a huge 
financial burden (Chirwa and Dorward 2013; Jayne and Rashid 2013). 
Their effectiveness has become increasingly questioned due to capture 
by wealthier farmers (Pan and Christiaensen 2012; Ricker-Gilbert 
and Jayne 2012). Due to the fiscal unsustainability and inefficiency 
of  these state-controlled policies, structural adjustment programmes 
were introduced in the agricultural sector in the 1980s and 1990s. 
These programmes created liberalised input and output markets with 
the abolition of  pan-territorial prices, the privatisation of  state-owned 
enterprises and the removal of  input subsidies. Although a positive 
growth rate of  agricultural gross domestic product (GDP) per capita 
has been reported since then, food crop yields have been stagnant in the 
region (World Bank 2007). One of  the reasons for this low productivity 
has been the low level of  input use (Crawford, Jayne and Kelly 2006).
Subsidy programmes have been popular among politicians since they 
provided direct support to rural voters and ‘compensate(d) for the lack 
of  longer-term investment for infrastructure and short-cut the need for 
more complex coordination efforts for market development’ (Poulton, 
Dorward and Kydd 2009: 1416). Subsidy programmes were continued in 
Malawi and Zambia, justified on the basis of  the threat of  food insecurity 
from drought and a stagnant economy. Since the early 2000s, other SSA 
countries have also gradually reintroduced input subsidy programmes 
using resources generated through debt cancellation under the Highly-
Indebted Poor Countries (HIPC) initiative and General Budget Support.
The reintroduction of  input subsidies often caused considerable tension 
between government and donors. The main opponents cited a history 
of  inefficiencies due to mismanagement and fraud. However, the 
donors’ positions varied over time and were not consistent even within 
the same institutions (Potter 2005; Chirwa and Dorward 2013), due 
either to differing ideologies or to the lack of  evidence available as to 
the effects and efficiency of  the subsidies.
At least eight countries have introduced or reintroduced input subsidies 
in the region (Crawford et al. 2006; Druilhe and Barreiro-Hurle 2012). 
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These input subsidies have evolved from demonstration packs to large 
subsidy programmes, but have mainly shifted to targeting small-scale 
farmers, as in Kenya, Malawi, Rwanda, the United Republic of  
Tanzania, Zambia, Mozambique, Nigeria and Ghana1 (Druilhe and 
Barreiro-Hurle 2012; Liverpool-Tasie 2012b). We focus here on 
‘market-smart’ subsidies, targeting small-scale farmers and promoting 
private sector development. Evidence shows that these subsidies 
have increased fertiliser use, average food crop yields and food crop 
production. But success depends on the context, and their design 
and implementation features (Dorward and Kydd 2005; Druilhe and 
Barreiro-Hurle 2012; Chirwa and Dorward 2013).
Input subsidies have been contentious. Opponents suggest that they are 
too expensive and suffer from fraud and mismanagement (World Bank 
2007: 115; Ricker-Gilbert, Jayne and Shively 2013: 1). In addition, they 
tend to benefit wealthier farmers the most, rather than poor farmers, 
creating a widening gap between these two groups (Ricker-Gilbert and 
Jayne 2012). Proponents suggest that they educate farmers on input 
use and, if  used properly, will develop the private sector which will give 
farmers better access to inputs (Crawford et al. 2006; Minot and Benson 
2009; Chirwa and Dorward 2013). This article provides a review of  
the features and effects of  these new subsidies. We first review five 
input subsidy programmes in Malawi, Zambia, Ghana, Nigeria and 
Tanzania, as these countries conducted the principal ‘market-smart’ 
subsidy programmes in SSA. We then focus on a case study carried out 
using mixed methods in Ruvuma Region in the Southern Highlands of  
Tanzania, which is a ‘high-potential area’ for input use. We conclude 
with an overview of  the challenges posed by these programmes and 
opportunities for their strengthening.
2 Overview of five ‘market-smart’ subsidy programmes in SSA
2.1 Design and implementation of ‘market-smart’ input subsidies
Contemporary agricultural subsidy programmes generally have two 
objectives: (1) to increase national food security and accelerate economic 
growth through increased maize/rice production; and (2) to reduce 
poverty among small-scale farmers by improving household food security 
through increased production from increased use of  inputs (Chirwa and 
Dorward 2013; Ricker-Gilbert et al. 2013). Targeting small-scale farmers 
explicitly supports the second objective and perhaps increases the 
effectiveness of  the programme by increasing input use, given that these 
farmers generally had not used inputs before the programme.2
In aiming to overcome the past deficiencies of  input subsidies, 
‘market-smart’ input subsidies: (1) target small-scale vulnerable farmers 
who did not use inputs before but are expected to find it profitable to 
do so; (2) promote private sector development, where the private sector 
procures and distributes inputs by using vouchers, matching grants 
and loan guarantees; and (3) have an ‘exit’ strategy, because of  their 
huge financial burden on governments and because of  their possible 
contribution to market distortion (Morris et al. 2007; Chirwa and 
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Table 1 Characteristics of five input subsidy programmes in sub-Saharan Africa
Malawi Zambia Ghana Tanzania Nigeria
Programme Farm Input 
Subsidy 
Programme
Farm Input 
Subsidy 
Programme
Fertiliser Subsidy 
Programme
National 
Agricultural Input 
Voucher Scheme
Growth 
Enhancement 
Support Scheme
Year implemented 2005/06 2009 2008–13, 2015 2008/09–2013/14 2012 
Programme 
objectives
Improve resource-
poor smallholder 
farmers’ access to 
improved inputs in 
order to achieve 
household and 
national food self-
sufficiency, and 
raise incomes
Improve 
household and 
national food 
security, incomes, 
and small-scale 
farmers’ access to 
agricultural inputs 
Enhance national 
food production 
and security 
Reduce poverty 
and household 
food insecurity as 
well as achieve 
economic growth 
and national food 
security
Promote fertiliser 
demand and 
private input 
sector
Targeted crop Maize, legumes, 
and other cash 
crops (reverting 
to maize and 
legumes only since 
2009/10)
Maize Maize or rice, and 
legumes (soya 
bean)
Maize or rice Maize or rice
Targeted 
beneficiaries
Smallholder 
farmers, with 
female-headed 
households a 
priority
Small-scale 
farmers (less than 
5ha) 
Smallholder food 
crop farmers 
(maize, rice, 
sorghum and 
millet)
Small-scale 
farmers (less than 
1ha, although 
this criterion 
was eliminated 
in 2010) able 
to pay for and 
use inputs with 
female-headed 
households as a 
priority
Smallholder 
farmers 
Beneficiary 
selection 
mechanism
Varied with 
time – through 
traditional 
authorities, varied 
stakeholders, 
village 
development 
committees, open 
meetings for 
allocation led by 
the Ministry of 
Agriculture and 
Food Security
Cooperative 
boards, extension 
officers, and 
local leaders 
are involved in 
selection 
Extension officers Village voucher 
committee
Farmer 
registration
Subsidy delivery Coupons Farmer 
cooperatives 
(piloted 
e-voucher)
Coupons Voucher E-voucher 
through mobile 
phone
cont./
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Table 1 Characteristics of five input subsidy programmes in sub-Saharan Africa (cont.)
Malawi Zambia Ghana Tanzania Nigeria
Subsidised input 
package
50kg of fertiliser  
+ 2–4kg of seeds
200kg of fertiliser 
+ 10kg of maize 
No standard 
package 
(compound 
fertiliser + urea)
100kg of fertiliser 
+ 10kg of seeds
100kg of fertiliser 
+ seeds 
Subsidy amount About 64–93 per 
cent of input cost
About 50–75 per 
cent of input cost
About 50 per cent 
of input cost
About 50 per cent 
of input cost
About 40 per 
cent of input cost
Exit strategy Not explicit Scaling-down as 
the years go by
No – one-year 
programme
Three-year exit 
plan
No
Monitoring and 
evaluation system
Yes – numerous 
evaluation studies 
implemented 
(SOAS et al. 2008; 
Dorward et al. 
2010)
Yes Not reported Yes – conducted 
impact evaluation 
(Patel 2011; 
URT 2014)
Not reported
Private sector 
development
Yes, but limited; 
the private 
sector has been 
involved in parallel 
with parastatal 
distribution and 
retailing (Chirwa 
and Dorward 
2013)
Yes, but limited to 
a few contracted 
retailers. Concerns 
were raised that 
the programme 
discouraged private 
participation 
(Mason et al. 2013)
Yes, but limited to 
big input supplier 
companies, 
which reduced 
competition and 
sales by smaller 
retailers (Benin et al. 
2013; Chirwa and 
Dorward 2013)
Yes. In some cases 
small agro-dealers 
could not deliver 
the inputs, and big 
retailers tended 
to be assigned for 
delivery by district 
government 
Yes (Liverpool-
Tasie and 
Takeshima 2013) 
Source Authors’ development.
Dorward 2013; Jayne and Rashid 2013).3 In addition, the use of  vouchers 
emerged as a mechanism for simultaneously targeting subsidies and 
promoting the private sector. The overview of  several features of  these 
programmes in the five SSA countries under study is given in Table 1.
Most of  these programmes used decentralised targeting, through 
traditional authorities, local key stakeholders, voucher committees, 
or farmer cooperatives. Use of  local stakeholders’ knowledge during 
targeting reduces administrative cost, and is common in various anti-
poverty programmes (Grosh et al. 2008). In the case of  Tanzania, 
voucher committees were established from national to village levels 
(World Bank 2009). The national level decides the rules and regulations 
of  the programme and evaluates it. This multisectoral arrangement 
encompasses the government, private sector and farmers’ groups. The 
regional and district committees decide voucher allocation to the lower 
levels and monitors the programme implementation. The village-level 
committees select the beneficiary and monitor whether they use inputs.
Though targeting methods varied, all the programmes studied here target 
small-scale farmers. However, studies suggest that leakage to wealthier 
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farmers and elite capture were found in most of  the countries (Pan and 
Christiaensen 2012; Chirwa and Dorward 2013; Jayne and Rashid 2013). 
In our case study in Tanzania (see Section 3) and in other programmes, 
decentralised targeting using vouchers based on eligibility criteria – albeit 
ostensibly more cost-effective and a better way of  targeting those in need – 
has often been subject to elite capture and fraud, and therefore does not work 
efficiently (Pan and Christiaensen 2012). Liverpool-Tasie (2012a) analysed 
how the programme in Nigeria targeted farmer groups which would later 
distribute inputs among smallholder farmers; she suggests that social capital 
and intragroup dynamics were important in voucher allocation. Female-
headed households were prioritised in several countries including Malawi, 
Zambia and Tanzania. However, the evidence in Malawi and the qualitative 
information in our study in Tanzania show that female-headed households 
had difficulty obtaining subsidised inputs (Chirwa et al. 2011). An e-voucher 
system, which avoids manipulation by government officers, politicians, village 
leaders and agro-dealers by delivering inputs via private input traders directly 
to the recipients’ mobile phones, was piloted in Zambia and is also currently 
being implemented in Nigeria.
2.2 Input delivery
After attempts such as the Starter Pack and the Targeted Input 
Programme, Malawi launched the first modern Farm Input Subsidy 
Programme (FISP) across much of  the country in 2004/05. This 
programme aimed to overcome the problems of  previous input 
subsidies: it was targeted at small-scale farmers and achieved wide 
coverage through the use of  vouchers (sometimes known as ‘coupons’); 
and it used the private sector for the procurement and delivery of  inputs 
in order not to distort the input market. This innovative approach, 
called a ‘market-smart’ subsidy (Minot and Benson 2009), led to 
increasing maize production and yields from 2005/06 to 2008/09 
(Dorward and Chirwa 2011). This success gave impetus to the 
pro-subsidy lobby and led to the unanimous commitment of  the African 
Union states to increasing input use through ‘market-smart’ subsidies to 
promote food crop yields, mainly of  maize (AU 2006). Since the food 
and input price spikes in 2008, donors such as the World Bank have 
been supporting these programmes (Benin et al. 2013).
In terms of  input procurement and delivery, the Malawi programme 
used parastatal agencies for input distribution and retailing, but with 
some participation by private agents in order for mutual trust between 
government and the private sector to be developed (Chirwa and Dorward 
2013). In Tanzania and Nigeria these activities were undertaken by the 
private sector, which promoted the development of  a private input sector 
through the increased input demand created by subsidies (Liverpool-Tasie 
and Takeshima 2013; URT 2014), while in Zambia and Ghana input 
delivery was limited to a few contracted, big input supplier companies, 
which reduced competition (Mason et al. 2013; Benin et al. 2013). There 
were problems in input delivery – late input delivery being the inherent 
problem – due to lack of  administrative capacities of  the government 
and/or lack of  capacity of  the agro-dealers.
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2.3 Effects and challenges of the ‘market-smart’ input subsidies
Studies suggest that most of  the programmes brought about increased 
maize production and maize yields when climatic and economic 
conditions were favourable. However, a synthesis of  recent studies (Jayne 
and Rashid 2013) suggests that the costs of  the programme outweighs 
their benefits. The production gains have been found to be limited due 
to low fertiliser use efficiency, missing vouchers, and displacement of  
previously commercial input use (ibid.). The studies reported that the 
programmes in Malawi, Nigeria, Tanzania and Zambia found increased 
maize land productivity and output, and in Malawi and Nigeria also 
increased household income and reduced poverty (Xu et al. 2009b; 
Yawson et al. 2010; Awotide et al. 2013; URT 2014). Examining the field 
results of  rice-producing farms in Ghana, Wiredu, Zeller and Diagne 
(2015) suggest that the programme increased land productivity, but 
reduced labour productivity because more family labour was used in 
weeding and harvesting.
Meanwhile, most of  the programmes were found to be ineffective, 
due to leakage to wealthier farmers which promoted displacement of  
commercial input purchase, and late delivery of  vouchers and inputs. 
Using nationally representative panel data in Zambia, Xu et al. (2009a) 
suggest that the less developed the private sector, the more subsidies 
tend not to be displacing as they create fertiliser demand. One apparent 
solution for displacement is e-vouchers, as they deliver subsidised inputs 
directly to the small-scale farmer recipients’ mobile phone, not via 
government officials, by which Nigeria tripled fertiliser use from 2011 to 
2013 per hectare (World Bank 2015).
Studies suggest that input subsidies have had a wider impact on the 
economy through increased food crop production: this led to a reduction 
in consumer food prices, to the benefit of  poor food consumers; and an 
increase in rural agricultural wages (Druilhe and Barreiro-Hurle 2012; 
Chirwa and Dorward 2013; Dorward and Chirwa 2013). However, the 
benefit has varied with the nature of  the subsidies and their context in 
the market, as well as with the weather. Chirwa and Dorward (2013) 
suggest that the large scale of  the programme relative to the past fertiliser 
demand brought a reduction in real maize prices, and that it promoted 
private sector development and agricultural growth. An increase of  
input use by non-recipient farmers which was probably due to the 
informational spillover effect was observed in Tanzania (URT 2014). 
The right benefit–cost ratio (BCR) was keenly debated in the case of  
Malawi (Jayne et al. 2013, 2015; Dorward and Chirwa 2015). Jayne et al. 
(2015) suggest that the ratio is negative and that investment in traditional 
public goods such as agricultural R&D and extension, or road, rural 
electrification or other productivity-enhancing investment should be 
priorities rather than continuous investment in unproductive subsidy 
programmes (Fan, Gulati and Thorat 2007).
Compared to previous subsidy programmes, all the new programmes 
found it challenging to improve targeting, transparency, timely delivery 
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of  voucher distribution, or monitoring and evaluation. Subsidies 
may also have preferentially benefited areas where the government 
leadership had a political interest (Banful 2011). The programme in 
Tanzania found that the late redemption of  vouchers by the National 
Microfinance Bank caused reluctance among the agro-dealers to 
continue in the subsidy business.
3 The case of Tanzania – the National Agricultural Input Voucher 
Scheme (NAIVS)
This section provides a mixed-methods case study on the Tanzanian 
voucher scheme (NAIVS) carried out in Ruvuma Region in Tanzania. 
By using mixed methods we could provide evidence on the impact 
quantitatively and the qualitative research provided crucial insight 
into the factors that impacted upon programme performance and 
outcomes. As Ruvuma normally has a good rainfall, and received a 
relatively substantial amount of  subsidy per farmer – 10 per cent of  
the subsidy distributed in the country for 3 per cent of  the national 
population – the study could expect to observe some impact. It could 
thus be relevant as a case study for input subsidies in general in SSA. 
The study employs: (a) panel data from 340 farm households collected 
in Ruvuma during the agricultural season previous to the pilot year of  
the subsidy programme4 and again in its third year in order to measure 
the programme’s impact; (b) qualitative information from 130 key-
informant interviews; (c) five farmer-group discussions which were 
mainly conducted in the region; and (d) secondary data sources.
The intention of  the programme was to respond to the food and input 
crisis in 2008 by ensuring food security, especially that of  the poor 
and vulnerable households facing food and input price hikes. This 
accords with poverty reduction and economic growth under the overall 
framework of  the National Strategy for Growth and Reduction of  
Poverty and to prioritising the provision of  inputs and services in the 
Agricultural Sector Development Programme (ASDP). The programme 
was originally meant to be short term and had an ‘exit’ strategy.
Our quantitative and qualitative studies found that unclear programme 
design and various problems in implementation made it unlikely that the 
programme would yield the expected effects. The panel data regression 
results do not show any statistically significant impact of  voucher receipt 
on maize yield, income poverty, calorie consumption, household assets or 
sending children to school among recipient households. Meanwhile, the 
qualitative data revealed a positive impact on maize yields, food security 
and poverty reduction. These contradictory results between quantitative 
and qualitative findings might have been due to the way the panel 
households were selected, or to the reporting errors in both methods 
of  data collection, such as conformational bias of  the interviewees 
(Copestake and Remnant 2015) and recalling errors (Deaton 1997). 
While recognising this data limitation, we suggest that the programme 
did not bring about the expected direct impact on poverty and farmers’ 
livelihoods due to flaws in design and implementation.
(Endnotes)
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The programme had originally a dualistic design of  aiming for national 
as well as household food security. After the crisis ended, in 2011 the 
targeted group officially changed from small-scale farmers with less than 
one hectare under maize or rice cultivation to middle-scale farmers, 
who cultivate more than one hectare of  maize or rice and are able to 
pay a top-up. However, this reflected the reality revealed since the pilot 
year. In the first years in practice, better-off farmers became the main 
users of  vouchers because small farmers often did not understand the 
benefits of  input use and anyway could not afford to pay a top-up. It 
became more difficult for the poor farmers to pay a top-up as the years 
went by due to the increase in input prices. And the change in the target 
group also made it difficult to target the same households for three 
years in order to achieve the stated ‘exit’ strategy, which was actually 
hindered from the egalitarian distribution of  vouchers by village leaders. 
This made a thin distribution of  vouchers, with 68 per cent of  recipient 
households receiving vouchers for only one or two years.
The implementation of  the programme was also flawed due to 
the frequent late delivery of  vouchers, corruption, patron–client 
relationship, politicised voucher allocation, illegal collusion between 
leaders and agro-dealers, missing vouchers and resale of  vouchers 
by farmers. We found a large gap between the government data on 
the number of  vouchers distributed in the region and the number 
of  vouchers received as reported by panel households. According to 
government data, the number of  vouchers distributed in the region 
was nearly three vouchers per farm household during four years of  the 
programme. The practice was very different; a little more than half  of  
panel recipient households were actually issued with vouchers but only 
in one or two years. The ‘missing vouchers’ might have been captured 
by agro-dealers, or by leaders from regional to village level. Vouchers 
are exchangeable for money, and thus became a source of  conflict. 
When fewer vouchers were distributed, tension became higher among 
villagers, village leaders, agro-dealers, government officers and lower 
level politicians. But in the end, politicians, government officials, village 
leaders and agro-dealers got most of  the benefit, while small-scale, poor 
farmers benefited least from the programme.
An unforeseen problem was the increasing real top-up price which 
voucher recipients had to pay. This was due to the rise in international 
market prices, which was also promoted by the power of  multinational 
input supplier companies who provided the inputs to NAIVS. Due to 
the rise of  input market prices, the real value of  vouchers to farmers 
was reduced. With relatively stagnant real maize prices, this made it 
increasingly difficult for small-scale farmers to pay a top-up.
The challenges of  effectiveness and efficiency could be met by making the 
programme intention clear, strengthening programme design and having 
a proper implementation plan, while developing sufficient institutional 
capacity to run the programme well. A mechanism for voucher delivery 
which is independent of  the government administration system needs 
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to be established. The implementation plan put in place must seek to 
prevent the illegal behaviours described above. Effective monitoring and 
evaluation is necessary for implementation to be accountable.
Part of  the subsidy was used as intended, which increased maize 
production due to the expansion of  the total cultivated area, brought 
about better food security in the region, and raised awareness of  
the effects of  the inputs on maize production. We also found the 
subsidy had an indirect wider impact on lowering real maize prices 
and increasing real agricultural wages in the region, which benefited 
net-food buyer and labour-surplus poor farmers but negatively affected 
net-food sellers, who were the majority of  households in Ruvuma. We 
also found that the private input sector developed. The programme 
played an important part in input procurement, and especially in 
delivery to rural areas. The agro-dealers who worked with NAIVS 
expressed their intention to carry on after the programme ends, since 
they know that there is increased demand, and have established links 
between themselves and farmers. Meanwhile, the increased input 
demand has been hampered by the increased price of  urea in recent 
years, which has caused a decrease in import quantity.
4 Successes of and challenges to input subsidy programmes in SSA
This article has so far provided an overview of  the generic features and 
effects of  agricultural subsidies in SSA. This concluding section focuses 
on challenges to consider for future development of  the new ‘market-
smart’ subsidies now been framed and explored in many SSA countries.
The recent input subsidy programmes were reported to be generally 
successful in increasing input use, maize production, maize yields and 
food security, at least under favourable economic and weather conditions, 
and in promoting private rural input business. A fall in maize prices and 
an increase in local agricultural wages were also reported in Malawi and 
our study in Ruvuma Region. These effects benefit net-food buyers and 
labour-surplus smallholders (Chirwa and Dorward 2013).
However, unclear programme objectives and the various 
implementation problems prevented most input subsidy programmes 
from being effective and efficient. A common challenge existed around 
the programme objectives; whether these were greater national 
maize production and national food security, or the increased use 
of  productivity-enhancing inputs by poor, small-scale farmers to 
increase their household food security. In the programmes recently 
implemented, these two objectives, with different implications for 
targeting, run alongside each other. With a national food security 
concern, effectiveness would suggest more emphasis upon increasing 
the marketed surplus and therefore a preference for targeting larger 
farmers. However, from an efficiency perspective, marginal productivity 
might be expected to increase most on farms using lower levels of  
input use per hectare, which tend to be the small farms. Targeting 
smaller farmers is clearly also likely to better serve poverty reduction 
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and is also more likely to promote more widespread use of  inputs in 
the long term when these smaller farmers are persuaded of  the gains 
from use of  improved seed and fertiliser because of  their learning 
through the subsidy programme. Thus, it is quite possible that these 
different objectives are best served by different targeting strategies. 
Addressing effectiveness and efficiency concerns meaningfully therefore 
requires clarity in programme objectives and appropriate design and 
implementation plans to achieve them.
These results serve to underline the controversial nature of  subsidy 
policies and contemporary debate mirrors historic controversy. One 
of  the historic challenges has been to base policy reform on evidence 
rather than ideology. Today at last, the evidence to support specific 
policy agendas is beginning to emerge. The studies suggest that there 
were frequent reports of  elite capture and illicit behaviour. As seen in 
Ruvuma Region, input subsidy can be a source of  tension and conflict 
in the villages and can increase the gap between middle-scale and 
poor farmers, where the wealthier and more powerful win most of  the 
benefit. Input subsidies should be targeted more effectively at poor, 
small-scale farmers, which would also serve social protection needs 
(Ellis, Devereux and White 2009; FAO 2015).
Despite the negative effects noted, there were positive impacts, such 
as spillover effects on input use to non-recipients and private sector 
development in rural areas. The mechanisms to deliver vouchers 
should be reconsidered in order to reduce the risk of  embezzlement of  
vouchers. Also, the involvement of  the private sector for procurement 
and delivery should be considered depending on the stages of  input 
private sector development. Improved programme monitoring and 
evaluation is also important, for example to assess the efficacy of  
promising institutional innovation in delivery such as subsidies provided 
by e-voucher, piloted in Zambia and implemented in Nigeria.
Notes
1 The ones in Burkina Faso, Senegal and Mali were universally 
distributed.
2 There are no scale economies in fertiliser use; nevertheless, an 
alternative argument is that larger farmers might be better educated 
or more experienced in fertiliser use and achieve higher marginal 
productivity. The evidence either way is not wholly conclusive but 
the evidence on lower fertiliser use per hectare by smaller farmers 
and the normal assumption of  declining returns suggest the marginal 
productivity argument supports the small farm case.
3 However, among the subsidy programmes studied, only that in 
Tanzania explicitly mentioned ‘exit’.
4 Household Vulnerability Panel conducted by the World Bank and 
FAO (Christiaensen and Pan 2009).
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